intuitive belief in Him. Others have supposed that there are certain intuitive principles which, proceeding upon external facts, lead to a conviction of the existence of God. To this latter view we give our adherence. There are in the world numberless traces of effects, of effects of design, and the intuitive principle of causation constrains us to look for a cause in a designing mind. This does not make the argument apodictic or demonstrative ; it contains an experiential af^ell as an intuitive element. Still the truth is one of the very highest moral certainty, such, as Coleridge remarks, as it is " little less than impossible not to believe,—onty indeed just so much short of impossible as to leave some room for the will and the moral election, and to keep it a truth of religion, and the possible subject ot a commandment." The external facts are so obvious, and the internal principles work so spontaneously, that man may be said, if not intuitively, at least naturally to believe in the existence of a God. All this, we acknowledge, does not prove that God is infinite, or that he is morally good. The evidence for these perfections is derived from our intuitive convictions regarding infinity (see p. 534), and regarding moral good (see pp. 9 and 333); both however proceeding on a previous conviction of the existence of a God possessed of indefinite power and intelligence.

It has been far too readily granted, not only by German but by British metaphysicians and divines, that Kant has for ever cut up by the roots the usual theistic arguments. These arguments are classified by him as, first, the Ontological, or that derived from the very idea of the infinite, the perfect in the mind; second, the Cosmological, or that which infers from the world as a bare existence to the existence of Absolute Being; and third, the Physico-Theological, or that from traces of design. We have no partiality for the two first; but we maintain that the third is conclusive when properly stated, and that it can be fully vindicated. Kant was precluded from acknowledging the validity of this argument, because he had given a defective and utterly erroneous view of causation, making it point to no objective existence, a mere form in the mind, and not a law of things. But when we take the proper view of the law of causation, when we look upon it as declaring that cause has an objective reality in the nature of things, and ever resides in a substance, then it entitles us to rise from the effects in nature to a power in a being above nature (see Art. III. and IV.) It is all true, as Kant urges, that this does not prove that God is infinite, but it proves that he is a living intelligent being, possessed of indefinite power; and this allows our intuition as to infinity to clothe him with infinite attributes.

The late Sir William Hamilton, notwithstanding his having stood up so resolutely for the validity of the principles of common sense, has allowed himself, as it appears to us, to fall in far too implicitly with Kant, when he gives to our convictions a merely subjective reality. He agrees with Kant in representing cause and effect (as also space and time) as laws of thought and not of things (see Discus-

sions in Philosophy, pp. 607-624, 2d edition). He farther represents our conception of infinity as negative, and our conviction in regard to it as an impotency. With such a metaphysics it is impossible to construct an argument from man's intelligence in favour of the Divine existence, and so we do not wonder to find him agreeing with Kant, that " the only valid argument for the existence of God, or the immortality of the soul, rests on the grounds of man's moral nature " (Dis. p. 623). Comparing his philosophy of the Conditioned with that of the Absolute, as evolved in Germany, he says, " In one respect both coincide, for both agree that the knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy; * *Scire Nihil*—studium quo nos laetamur utrique." But the one doctrine, maintaining that the Nothing must yield everything, is a philosophic omniscience; whereas the other,